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 1 
EU Equality Law after a Decade of Austerity: On the Social Pillar and its Transformative 
Potential 
 
Sara Benedi Lahuerta1 and Ania Zbyszewska2 
 
Abstract  
 
This article discusses the evolution of EU legislation and policymaking methods during the ten 
years since the onset of the financial and economic crisis in 2007/2008. In the EU, this period has 
been characterized by politics of stimulus, austerity and recovery. Against the backdrop of longer-
term developments in the equality law field, we consider how this crisis context influenced this 
field’s evolution. Through analysis of a range of legislative and policy proposals, we show that the 
progressive softening or hybridization of equality law over this period has gone hand in hand with 
the stronger articulation of equality objectives in terms of a ‘business case’. While this approach 
appears to have enabled proliferation of policy and legal instruments and expanded the reach of 
equality law into areas where the EU has limited competence to legislate, it has also elevated 
instrumental economic goals for action at expense of human rights or social rationales. This 
longer-term tendency is also present in the recently adopted European Pillar of Social Rights, and 
the accompanying policy documentation, which have been hailed as carrying potential to infuse 
more coherence and to rebalance the social and economic rationales that the EU integration 
project has unevenly promoted over the years. Mindful that it is still too early for conclusive 
judgments, we suggest, however, that the transformative possibilities the Pillar carries are likely 
to be undermined by its soft and economically oriented thrust. 
 
Key words: EU equality law; coherence; Social Pillar; soft-law; hybrid regulation; 
marketization 
 
1. Introduction 
 
On launching the European Pillar of Social Rights (‘the Pillar’) (Commission 2017b) at the 
Social Summit for Fair Jobs and Growth in Gothenburg in November 2017, the European 
Commission President, Jean-Claude Juncker, remarked that the Pillar is not simply ‘a 
poem’ but rather ‘a programme of principles first, a programme of action next’ 
(Commission 2017f). The Pillar notably arrives as Europe recovers from one of the most 
acute financial and economic crises in decades, which have increased inequalities 
between member states (MS) and between citizens, left more Europeans at the risk of 
poverty and social exclusion (Commission 2016f), and contributed to rise of populism and 
Euroscepticism. As such, the Pillar’s adoption appears to signal recognition that halting a                                                         
This article stems from a project that was funded by the Economic and Social Research Council Impact 
Acceleration Accounts (ESRC IAA) at the University of Southampton and University of Warwick. We also 
received funding from the Society of Legal Scholars, the University of Warwick Institute of Advanced Studies 
(IAS), and the University of Southampton Centre for Law, Policy and Society. 
1 University of Southampton Law School. 
2 University of Warwick Law School. 
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race to the bottom in social standards and fulfilling the promise of a fairer, more equal 
Europe requires prompt action to rebalance the European Union’s (EU) social and market 
dimensions. 
In this paper, we consider whether the Pillar indeed carries such a potential. Given the 
Commission’s assertion that the Pillar expands the application of equal treatment and 
non-discrimination principles beyond their current scope (Commission 2017b: 12, 15, 65), 
our focus is specifically on its contribution to the field of EU equality law.3 In particular, 
we consider the potential of the Pillar to make this policymaking area more robust, 
coherent,4 and transformative (see also Busby, in this issue). 
Rather than considering the Pillar in isolation, we locate it in the context of longer-term 
regulatory trends in EU social and equality law and policy, with attention placed primarily 
on measures proposed over the last decade (2008 - 2018). This period saw the emergence 
of a ‘new generation of equality law’, which embraces softer legal modes resulting in 
hybrid regulation. Theoretically, such hybridity might open the scope of possibilities for 
expanding the reach of equality law beyond the current EU competences. As such, this 
new approach could contribute to build a more coherent legal framework, which better 
articulates equality law with other pertinent policy fields that are necessary for the 
achievement of equality in practice. However, the extent to which it is possible to 
promote substantive and transformative equality through such soft and hybrid measures, 
remains an important question, especially in a climate of austerity and following the post-
2008 erosion of national social models. As we show in this paper, the economic and 
political fallout of the crisis itself and of the EU-led response, combined with the European 
Commission’s promotion of the ‘Better Regulation’ approach5, have contributed not only 
to a progressive softening of equality law but also to a significant shift in the framing of 
recently proposed equality measures. Namely, a shift away from the discourse of 
fundamental human rights to that re-asserting the market-enhancing and business case 
for equality. Against this background, we consider whether the Pillar might be successful 
in re-centering the social and, in relation to equality law, in promoting a transformative 
conception of equality beyond market-making rationales. 
The paper starts with a brief outline of the longer-term development of EU equality law 
and related policy, highlighting the expansion and transformation of the equal treatment 
principle from a market-focus to a more substantive and transformative conception, more                                                         
3 Our conception of equality law extends beyond equal treatment and non-discrimination, to encompass 
other policy fields that are supportive or necessary for the practical realization of equality objectives (for 
elaboration, see Benedi Lahuerta and Zbyszewska (2017)). This broader conception is not only consistent 
with a multi-dimensional notion of equality (see Fredman (2011)) but also finds reflection in the historical 
development of EU approach to equality. 
4 We contend that incoherence in EU equality law is located at three levels. Beyond the internal and external 
incoherence typically discussed in EU equality law debates, the inconsistencies and poor articulation 
between equality law and other policy fields of consequence to equality ends also leads to a form of 
incoherence we term ‘systemic’, see Benedi Lahuerta and Zbyszewska (2017). 
5 See section 2 for discussion and references. 
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explicitly framed in human rights terms (section 2). We observe a halting of this 
development, and a subsequent shift in direction post-2008, which we then explore in 
more detail in section 3. Through the analysis of a selection of EU instruments and 
initiatives section 3 reveals a progressive re-framing of these proposals in market and 
business-oriented terms, paralleled with their softening or hybridization, particularly 
after 2010. In light of this development, we continue in section 4 with a theoretical 
discussion on soft and hybrid modes of regulation, reflecting on their particular utility and 
limitations in a legal and policy field such as equality. We then move in section 5 to the 
analysis of the Pillar and related policy documents. We explore how the tendencies of 
softening and marketization have informed the way in which the Pillar itself is developed, 
and we reflect on the implications this framing has for the Pillar’s transformative 
potential. Section six concludes. 
 
2. Development of EU equality law 
 
The much-debated imbalance between social and market objectives and policies at the 
EU level is a legacy of the European integration project’s historical origin as a common 
market. As is well known, the founding treaties attributed notable economic 
competences to EU institutions (e.g. market regulation and competition policy) but left 
most social powers to the MS , save for a narrow set of exceptions (e.g. equal pay) 
(Barnard 2012a; Council of Europe 1956; International Labour Organisation 1956). This 
‘embedded liberal’ bargain could hold so long as national-level social models were able 
to offset the internal market’s social consequences (Ashiagbor 2013). Subsequent bouts 
of widening and deepening integration led to gradual albeit uneven expansion of the EU’s 
social dimension, in part because of differing national social standards and the alleged 
inability of governments to contain social effects of the common market domestically 
(e.g. unfair competition and regulatory race to the bottom) (Barnard 2012a). 
The incorporation of the equal treatment principle into the European Economic 
Community (EEC) Treaty from the start gave equality a relatively privileged position 
compared to other social areas. However, due to its original ‘market making’ objective 
the scope of this principle was initially narrowly construed as pertaining only to sex 
(specifically, equal pay; Art. 119 EEC, now Art. 157 TFEU) and national origin (Art. 6 EEC, 
now Art. 18 TFEU) and was for long time largely driven by the logic of market integration. 
This Treaty foothold, nonetheless, led to a rapid expansion of equality law beginning in 
1970s. To lend a ‘human face’ (Teague 1994) to the single market, the first Social Action 
Programme (Council 1974) supported a body of secondary legislation that effectively 
expanded Article 119 EEC beyond equal pay to a broader equal treatment principle (albeit 
only in relation to employment through Directive 76/207/EEC) (Bell 2011: 611, 615). 
Strategic litigation on sex equality of the Treaty provisions during the 1970s and 1980s 
resulted in recognition of the principles of equal pay for work of equal value, indirect 
discrimination, and their horizontal effect (Barnard 2012, Schiek 2007: 352-259, Bell 
2014:144), thereby endowing equal treatment with a far more substantive and 
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transformative dimension than that originally conceived by the Treaty. The Court of 
Justice’s interpretation of the equality legislation during this period also introduced a 
more expansive reading of equal treatment as inherently connected to the protection of 
human rights, as opposed to simply furthering the completion of the common market 
(Bell 2014). This decoupling of equality legislation from market integration was also 
gradually reflected in the evolving legislative framework, particularly following the 
Amsterdam Treaty amendments. For example, Article 3(2) EC (now Art. 8 TFEU) set an 
autonomous objective for the Union of eliminating inequalities and promoting equality 
between women and men, while Article 13 EC (now Art. 19 TFEU) enabled the Community 
to adopt non-discrimination legislation on the grounds of sex, racial or ethnic origin, 
religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation (Bell 2014:150). Similarly, the 1989 
(non-binding) Charter of the Fundamental Rights of Workers, elevated equal treatment 
to a fundamental right (Art. 16), which was then affirmed in secondary legislation, 
including Directive 97/80/EC on the burden of proof in sex discrimination cases (Benedi 
Lahuerta 2016: 351). Following the Amsterdam Treaty, the principle of equal (gender) 
treatment also started to be mainstreamed into other policy areas and integrated into 
European Employment Strategy (EES), which signaled the recognition of a need for more 
coherence and articulation across policy fields.  
Post 2000, EU equality law was increasingly framed through reference to the human rights 
discourse, not simply that of market integration (Schiek 2002: 290).6 The first decade of 
the new millennium saw adoption of several new non-discrimination directives, starting 
with the Race Equality Directive (2000/43/EC, O.J. L 180/22) and Framework Directive 
(2000/78/EC, O.J. L 303/16), both of which made clear references to human rights 
foundations of equality legislation and the fundamental character of equal treatment and 
non-discrimination principles (Bell 2014: 150).7 The Lisbon Treaty and the coming into 
force of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (CFREU, [2000] OJ C364/1) in 2009 
more explicitly constitutionalized (Bell 2014; Morris 2005: 33; O’Cinneide 2015: 370) and 
confirmed the status of equal treatment (Arts. 21, 23 CFREU) as a fundamental EU right. 
While the reach of the non-discrimination and equal treatment principles remains 
uncertain due to the different protective scopes of the Equality Directives (Benedi 
Lahuerta 2016), the CJEU’s expansive interpretation of the Charter provisions has also 
affirmed the fundamental status of these principles (Bell 2014; Xenidis 2017) . 
A major change in this trajectory occurred from 2008 on, coinciding with the early stages 
of the economic and financial crisis. In 2008 the Commission proposed a Directive to 
extend the prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief, disability, 
age or sexual orientation beyond employment, also known as the ‘Horizontal Equality 
Directive’ (Commission 2008b). While the proposal was in line with the 2000 Directives 
and the CFREU, and most MS recognised ‘the importance of promoting equal treatment                                                         
6 See, however, criticism over prevalence of economic over legal analysis at this stage in time in Sciarra 
(1999: 169-170). 
7 Also: Directive 2004/113/EC (gender equality in access to services), Directive 2006/54/EC (recast), O.J. 
2006, Directive 2010/41/EU (gender equality for the self-employed).  
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as a shared social value within the EU’ (Council 2008b: 2), recurrent concerns about in 
relation to subsidiarity, interferences with market freedoms of individuals and businesses 
and the financial and social protection implications of the proposal (particularly for SMEs) 
(Council 2008b: 2, 3, 25), meant that the proposal stalled. This blockage can partly be 
interpreted as a national ‘backlash’ against the CJEU’s expansion of equal treatment 
principle in prior years, in cases such as Mangold8 and Coleman,9 among others (Xenidis 
2017), where its application interfered with MS redistributive policies, such as those using 
age as a social stratifier (Numhauser Henning 2015). Paradoxically, whereas the CJEU has 
been subject to spirited critique for its market-freedom elevating and constitutionalizing 
interpretations in the controversial Viking10 and Laval11 line of cases (Becker and Warnek 
2011, Davies 2008: 126; Joerges and Rodl 2009: 18; Reich 2008; Rönnmar 2007-08; de 
Schutter 2011: 346), which have sidelined national social policy and labour rights in 
problematic ways (Garben 2017; Rasnaca 2017; Schiek 2015),12 its jurisprudence on equal 
treatment and non-discrimination appears to have articulated a more transformative 
conception of equality than the narrow internal market-based one originally conceived 
by the Treaties (Xenidis 2017).13 
Indeed the conception of equality viewed as a human right, appears to have more 
consistently and clearly come through in CJEU’s case law than it has in policy and 
legislative initiatives proposed by the European Commission, especially those put forth 
since 2008.The post-2008 period has seen a ‘new wave of antidiscrimination law,’ which, 
unlike the primarily legislative approach of previous years, prioritizes enforcement of 
existing law on the one hand, and utilizes more administrative and soft measures to 
complement existing law and expand into areas of limited competence on the other (De 
Búrca 2012; De Witte 2012). This new regulatory approach can be linked to the 
Commission Communication on ‘Smart Regulation’, which stressed that, to overcome the 
economic crisis, EU regulation should limit burdens on businesses (especially SMEs) to 
what is ‘strictly necessary’ to boost their competitiveness (Commission 2010b: 2). To 
achieve this, the Commission called for urgent review of ‘incomplete, ineffective, and 
underperforming regulatory measures’, and stressed the need to get ‘legislation right’ to 
‘deliver the ambitious objectives for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth’ 
(Commission 2010b: 2). Among others, greater emphasis has been placed on the 
                                                        
8 Case C-144/04 Werner Mangold v Rüdiger Helm EU:C:2005:709. 
9 Case C-303/06 Coleman v Attridge Law and Steve Law EU:C:2008:415. 
10 Case C-438/05 International Transport Workers’ Federation v Viking Line ABP EU:C:2007:772. 
11 Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundetn EU:C:2007:809. 
12 A similar tendency is evident in the Court’s decisions on Article 16, wherein it elevated the ‘freedom to 
conduct business’ to a fundamental right: see, e.g. Prassl (2013: 434) and Schiek (2017).  
13  However, this approach has its own limitations, especially in relation to balancing recognition of 
disadvantage with social policy ’ s redistributive function, and recognizing intersectional character of 
discrimination, see (Fudge and Zbyszewska 2015). Also, see Somek (2011) for a more general critique of EU 
non-discrimination law.  
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quantified cost-analysis in impact assessments (Commission 2010b: 7; Micklitz 2012: 
398). 
The possible relevance of this regulatory shift in the area of equality law is especially 
evident when we consider the changes in the wording of the 2003 and 2016 Inter-
institutional Agreements on Better Law making. Whereas the former emphasized that 
alternative regulation methods would ‘not be applicable where fundamental rights or 
important political options are at stake or in situations where the rules must be applied 
in a uniform fashion in all Member States’ (Parliament, Council and Commission 2003), 
the latter does not include a similar ‘exception’. On the contrary, the 2016 Agreement 
shifts towards consideration of administrative burdens for businesses (particularly SMEs) 
and prioritizes a cost-benefit analysis and competitiveness (Parliament, Council and 
Commission 2016). This change could have been partly influenced by the struggles of the 
2008 economic/sovereign debt crisis as well as the CFREU recognition of business rights 
(Art. 16). While EU social policy initiatives have always been accompanied by market 
justifications and have been tied to various strategic and growth objectives, after a period 
of more expansive framing of equality principles, the post-2008 period brought about a 
clear tendency to increasingly justify and subordinate proposed equality measures by 
reference to business concerns.  
As we demonstrate in the following section, the crisis context, as well as the changing 
regulatory approach of the Better Regulation and the ‘Smart Regulation’ documents, have 
had a significant influence on the legislative and policy measures put forward during the 
post-crisis period.  
 
3. EU Equality law & policy in the crisis and post-crisis: softer and increasingly 
marketized? 
 
In this section, we turn to a more detailed analysis of how the crisis affected the EU’s 
regulatory paradigm, and how this translated into the softening and the marketization of 
equality instruments or initiatives. To show this emerging pattern, we review measures 
proposed and negotiated over the 2008-2018 period. Our analysis suggests that they fall 
into three broad categories defined by the manner in which they were framed and their 
timing. The first category constitutes ‘hard’ legislation proposed at the start of the period 
(2008), during the stimulus phase of the EU crisis-response (2a). After 2010, the second 
category includes a set of proposals for ‘hard’ law, albeit framed in a more business-
friendly manner (2b), and finally, the last group encompasses a range of ‘softer’ and even 
more explicitly business-friendly measures (2c). 
 
a. The 2008 Directive Proposals face the crisis stumbling block 
 
The first category of instruments we identified in our review are 'hard' legislative 
measures based on the EU equal treatment and non-discrimination competences, which 
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have a strong human rights framing. Several such instruments were proposed at the 
outset of the period under consideration, coinciding with what some had characterized 
the 'first phase' of the EU's crisis response (Clasen et al. 2012: 12). The 2008 proposal for 
Horizontal Equality Directive (Commission 2008b) and the 2008 proposal for a new 
Maternity Leave Directive (Commission 2008a) are good illustrations. Both encountered 
significant opposition in the Council resulting in stalled negotiations. The latter proposal 
was abandoned by the Commission in 2015, and the former’s adoption is still pending a 
decade on, despite recent efforts to reinvigorate the negotiations. 
Our review of these proposals and discussions surrounding them suggests that they were 
doubly disadvantaged by this combination of timing and framing. The 2008 Horizontal 
Equality Directive proposal was rooted in the non-discrimination principle and the CFREU. 
It was also in line with the Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs (Commission 2005) and 
was said to carry possible benefits for the internal market (Commission 2008b: 2-3; 
Council 2008a: 52) but its core aims were to lessen the alleged hierarchy of discrimination 
grounds (Commission 2005) and bring EU law in line with the UN Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD)14. Primarily, therefore, the instrument was framed 
as a human rights tool that would overcome the ‘hierarchy’ of anti-discrimination grounds 
(Howard, in this issue) and thus would improve the coherence of equality law (Council 
2008a: 5). Similarly, with its origins in the Commission’s Roadmap for Equality Between 
Women and Men 2006-2010 (Commission 2006), the 2008 Maternity Leave Directive 
proposal was framed as facilitating the EU's gender equality commitments (Commission 
2008a). Unlike the 1992 Pregnant Workers Directive (92/85/EEC, O.J. L 348/1), which was 
based on Article 118a EEC Treaty (health and safety), the 2008 proposal utilized Articles 
137(b) (working conditions) and 141(3) EC Treaty (equal opportunities and equal 
treatment between women and men) as a combined legal basis. Accordingly, the 
proposal’s provisions on the extension of the period of maternity leave from 14 to 18 
weeks (Art. 8), and its introduction of job-protection clauses (Art. 10) and a right to return 
to the same or equivalent post (Art. 11), were justified as intrinsically linked to both health 
and safety and equal treatment. Ample references to the EU’s commitments to promoting 
gender equality and work-family reconciliation, for their own sake and in relation to their 
economic and growth benefits were also present in the Commission's explanatory 
documents (Commission 2008a: 2-3). 
The timing of both proposals was particularly ill-fated. Compared to the more favourable 
context in which the 2000 Equality Directives and the 1992 Pregnant Workers Directive 
were adopted, the Horizontal and Maternity Directive proposals were introduced at a 
time of the ‘Great Recession’ and when national priorities had consequently shifted. 
Concerns about the financial and cost implications of the proposals, and about potential 
negative impact on both social protection systems and businesses (particularly SMEs) 
were cited in Council discussions on each instrument. In the context of the Horizontal 
Equality Directive, Germany, questioned whether the proposal was timely and needed,                                                         
14 24 January 2007, UN Doc A/RES/61/106. 
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given its cost implications, and Poland, the Netherlands, UK, Czech Republic and Hungary 
signaled similar concerns (Council 2008b, 2011; Hugendubel 2015). Similarly, a number of 
MS were concerned about the costs associated with the proposed Maternity Leave 
Directive, particularly in light of the Parliament's push for extending the leave period to 
20 weeks, at full pay (Parliament 2010). In the Council, several MS deemed the extended 
pay provisions not to be ‘an appropriate basis for negotiation’ (Council 2010), particularly 
'in the context of the financial and economic crisis and the pressure towards fiscal 
consolidation' (Council 2008c). 
Thus, the combination of timing and framing translated into stalled negotiations and both 
proposals being blocked in the Council. As critics noted following the Commission's 2015 
decision to withdraw the proposed Maternity Leave Directive, the Council's constant 
invocation of the budgetary reasons signaled erosion of the EU's commitment to gender 
equality (Van den Abeele 2015: 55-57). Indeed, beyond a shift in political priorities during 
the Great Recession and the allegedly high costs of these proposals, the overall change in 
the political climate may have been also decisive. According to Veld MEP ‘governments 
[were] feeling pressured by populist and extremist parties and [were] too afraid to take a 
stand on equality’ (Social Platform 2014). Framing instruments in a strong human rights 
language at the time when the legitimacy of the EU's actions and influence over national 
policy was being increasingly questioned at the national level proved ill-fated for the 2008 
instruments. 
 
b. The first regulatory reaction to the crisis: 'hard' instruments proposed post-2010 
 
Following the regulatory intelligence accrued during the unsuccessful negotiations of the 
2008 proposals for a Horizontal Equality Directive and the Maternity Leave Directive, from 
2010 onwards the Commission changed its approach to make progress in its equality law 
agenda. Two key sets of instruments were launched in this period: a proposal for a 
Directive on Women on Company Boards (Commission 2012b) and, towards the end of 
the recession, a proposal for a Directive on accessibility requirements for products and 
services (Commission 2015c), also known as ‘European Accessibility Act’ (EAA). Both 
proposals sought to introduce binding measures that all MS would implement. Both could 
arguably enhance EU equality law, but, compared to the 2008 proposals, both evidenced 
a shift in the legal and discursive framing. Reflecting the post-2010 turn to austerity 
measures at EU and national level, both documents’ narrative heavily relies on economic 
justifications and the benefits the proposed measures could bring for the internal market, 
growth and businesses, with a significant sidelining of the human rights discourse. 
This trend can be readily observed in the Women on Boards Proposal. Despite initial 
references to equality between women and men as a human right and as a key founding 
value and aim of the EU in its own right,15 the document is awash with references to its                                                         
15 The Proposal refers to Articles 2 and 3(3) TEU, Article 8 TFEU, to the CFREU (Articles 15, 21, 23) and the 
principle of positive action, recognized in Article 157(4) TFEU, which is suggested as the legal basis. 
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benefits for the internal market (including both employment and financial markets), for 
listed companies and for investors. Overall, the proposal leans heavily towards its 
ultimate instrumental objective, i.e. to ‘exploit’ the talent that would be brought in by 
new female board members to achieve the Europe 2020 objectives (Commission 2012b: 
5; on instrumental use of policy see also Busby, in this issue). The document also points 
out how equality policies ‘are vital to economic growth, prosperity and competitiveness’ 
and underlines that imbalances in gender composition ‘affect the overall performance of 
companies, their accountability, the ability of investors to assess and factor appropriately 
and timely all relevant information, and the efficiency of the EU financial markets’ 
(Commission 2012b). Accordingly, whilst increasing women’s participation on company 
boards is, primarily, a matter of justice and human rights (European Women’s Lobby 
2014: 4), the Proposal is predominantly based on and driven by concerns around potential 
benefits for business, economic growth and competitiveness (Benito Sánchez 2015; 
Elomaki 2015: 288-302). 
A similar inclination can be traced in the Proposal for the EAA, which is part of the 
European Disability Strategy 2010-2020 (EDS) (Commission 2010c). The latter was 
designed to contribute to the Europe 2020 growth objectives (‘market approach’) as well 
as to meet the EU’s obligations under the UNCRPD regarding accessibility (‘human rights 
approach’). In this context, just as the 2008 Women on Company Boards Proposal, the 
proposed EAA is wrapped in a human rights language, but the case for facilitating 
accessibility is a strongly business-oriented one, with accessibility seen as an opportunity 
to ‘achieve the EU’s growth targets’ (Commission 2010c: 2-3). Indeed, the proposed EAA 
constantly relies on a ‘win-win’ argument to justify the suggested measures. For instance, 
the Act clearly seeks to improve accessibility of goods and services for disabled 
individuals, whilst simultaneously underscoring how greater accessibility would improve 
competition between economic operators, efficiency and free movement of goods and 
services (Commission 2015c: 2-3). Similarly, the Act is designed to support MS in achieving 
their accessibility commitments and obligations under the UNCRPD, but the proposal’s 
focus on inclusion is also substantiated on economic grounds, i.e. how greater inclusion 
and accessibility falls in line with the Europe 2020 Strategy’s objective of promoting 
‘smart, sustainable and inclusive growth’ (Commission 2014a: 9). 
In both above-mentioned instruments, this blending of market access, competition and 
efficiency arguments, on the one hand, and social, equality and human rights objectives, 
on the other hand, appears to present a ‘win-win’ outcome. Compared to the first 
category of instruments, these post-2010 hard law proposals put stronger emphasis on 
their benefits for the economy through contributing higher employment rates and 
consumption, free movement and growth. This greater accent on the business-case and 
the advantages for the internal market seems to be aimed at making these proposals 
more appealing for MS. Yet, this approach carries some undesirable risks, which suggest 
these proposals may not in fact lead to properly balanced ‘win-win’ outcomes. First, a 
shift towards a more market-based approach paralleled by a significant sidelining of the 
rights discourse is normatively highly problematic. Secondly, the substantive measures 
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proposed in these two instruments are themselves either less robust, more limited in 
scope or introduce significant restrictions in order to make the proposals appealing. This 
is evident in either the proposal as put forth by the Commission or in its subsequent 
discussion or position on it adopted by the co-legislators. 
 
c. The second regulatory reaction to the crisis: softer and more business-oriented 
instruments 
 
In this last category we include soft law measures proposed during the latter part of the 
crisis (i.e. post-2010) or since its 'end' (i.e. post-2014). As noted above, the Commission 
(2010b) has emphasized the importance of designing regulatory measures in a way that 
does not overburden businesses and stifle competitiveness. Several equality instruments 
launched from 2010 onwards illustrate this approach. For instance, EU Framework for 
National Roma Integration Strategy (Commission 2011), and the overall gender equality 
approach, exemplified in various instruments, such as the Women’s Charter (Commission 
2010a), the Pay Transparency Recommendation (Commission 2014c), or the Strategy for 
equality between women and men 2010-15 (Commission 2010d). In all these documents, 
the 'win-win' discourse already present in the instruments just discussed (3b) remains, 
but the measures have an even stronger business rationale and/or integrate a greater 
cost-benefit analysis. Indeed, it appears that the latter may even take priority over the 
human rights and equality rationales. Additionally, the measures themselves tend to be 
‘softer’ and more flexible, leaving MS more margin for maneuver, and leading, potentially, 
to larger substantive and implementation differences across the EU. 
Through Women’s Charter the Commission undertook to infuse a gender perspective into 
all EU policies and to promote gender equality. The Charter focuses on five areas of action: 
equality in the labour market, reducing the gender pay gap, equality in decision-making, 
gender-based violence and gender equality in external relations. Although the Charter 
initially presents gender equality as a common EU value and a fundamental right, it also 
immediately emphasizes that ‘[e]conomic and social cohesion, sustainable growth and 
competitiveness […] depend on real equality between women and men’. Indeed, the 
Gender Pay Gap (GPG) is mainly seen as ‘a cost that Europe cannot afford (Commission 
2010a: 4). The potential of gender equality progress for economic growth is further 
developed throughout the document (see e.g. Commission 2010a: section 3). Although 
the Charter states that it will be implemented through ‘both legislative and non-
legislative’ instruments, the balance strongly leans towards soft-law measures, often 
linked to economic governance. For instance, the document suggests that women’s 
greater economic independence in the labour market will mainly be encouraged through 
quantified targets in line with the Europe 2020 strategy (Commission 2010a: 3), 
presumably embedded in the European Semester. 
More specifically, as regards the GPG, the priorities set by the Women’s Charter have 
materialized in the Pay Transparency Recommendation, which has been equally justified 
in economic terms and is also being promoted through the European Semester 
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(Commission 2017d: 2, 10). While a welcome initiative, as a soft-law instrument it leaves 
MS plenty of flexibility to ‘cherry pick’ measures, which may vary widely in terms of 
effectiveness and enforceability. The Recommendation encourages MS ‘to implement the 
most appropriate measures for their specific circumstances and to implement at least one 
of the four core measures enhancing pay transparency’ (Commission 2014c: Recital 10, 
2017c). Yet, the potential of the core actions (i.e. entitlement to request pay information, 
company reporting, pay audits, equal pay collective bargaining) to achieve real change 
could differ significantly. In fact, recognizing employees’ right to request information on 
pay levels by gender and job category is simply a right to request,16 which employers 
could deny without consequence. In contrast, an outright negation of such information is 
less likely if a legislative obligation to report gender pay information or to conduct equal 
pay audits is established.17 Allowing MS to choose which measures to implement can 
translate into very different rights and obligations at the national level, which can impede 
the overall coherence of EU (equality) law. 
Indeed, MS may lawfully choose not to implement any core measure, given that the 
recommendation is non-binding. In this regard, the 2017 Commission Progress Report 
recognizes that ‘[d]espite the adoption of the Recommendation, only eleven MS have 
currently legislation on pay transparency in place’ and only six have adopted new 
measures or improved existing ones. Consequently, one in three MS have taken no action 
(Commission 2017d: 3, 10). 
This ‘win-win’ discourse, wherein social and economic objectives are deemed to be 
simultaneously pursued and capable of being achieved, is also evident in EU action against 
Roma discrimination. Here, EU regulation is based on two key soft-law instruments: the 
2011 Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies (FNRIS) (Commission 2011) and 
the 2013 Council Recommendation on effective Roma integration measures (Council 
2013). An analysis of the official discourse that accompanied, supported and followed 
these measures suggests that they have a dual rationale, based both on human rights and 
economic/market arguments. The 2010 Communication highlights not only the 
prohibition of ethnic discrimination as an EU right and value, but also that Roma inclusion 
is necessary to achieve the EU 2020 growth priorities and the ‘full integration of Roma will 
have important economic benefits for our societies’ (Commission 2010f: 2-3). Similarly, 
the 2012 Communication seems to assign equal importance to both rationales by stating 
that better integration of the Roma is ‘both a moral and an economic imperative’ 
(Commission 2012a: 2). In some documents, however, the economic/market rationale is 
even portrayed as being the primary aim, taking priority over the human rights one. The 
FNRIS is exemplary, as the Commission presents Roma integration as bringing                                                         
16 Similar to the right to request changes to working hours and/or patterns under Directive 2010/18/EU, 
Clause 6(1). For a critique of a right to request in the proposed Work-life Balance Directive, see Benedi 
Lahuerta and Zbyszewska (2018: 13-14) and Zbyszewska (2016). 
17 Furthermore, company reporting is encouraged for companies with 50+ employees, whereas pay audits 
for companies with 250+ employees, which seems a large difference and would leave SMEs, employing 
most EU workers, out of the pay audit obligations (Recommendations 4 and 5). 
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predominantly economic benefits (in terms of productivity, social assistance payments 
and revenues from income taxes) that ‘will also contribute to social cohesion and improve 
respect for fundamental rights’ (Commission 2011: 2-3). 
The FRNIS also states that ‘MS’ national strategies should […] contribute to social 
integration of Roma in mainstream society’ and ‘should fit into and contribute to the 
broader framework of the Europe 2020 strategy and […] be consistent with national 
reform programmes’ (Commission 2011: 8-9). This suggests that if the measures required 
to achieve Roma integration do not ‘fit’ into or ‘contribute’ to the economic rationale of 
the national reform programmes, they are inconsistent with Europe 2020, even if they 
could be valuable from a non-discrimination/human rights perspective. 
The earlier excerpts also evidence that prioritizing the socio-economic objectives creates 
a discourse saturated with positive terms, like ‘inclusion’, ‘integration’ and ‘diversity 
promotion’, which tends to minimize the extent and seriousness of structural 
discrimination, segregation and hatred the Roma experience. This trend is problematic 
because eradicating endemic discrimination against the Roma community is primarily a 
moral and justice imperative, based on human dignity, which is the source of the right to 
equality, a human right the EU is bound to protect. While economic benefits are 
important, they should not be presented as the primary rationale for action, especially at 
a time when anti-Gypsism is on the rise (see e.g. ECRI 2001: 4; Mirga-Kruszelnicka 2017: 
12). 
The fact that the EU Roma Framework is mainly, though not solely, based on soft-law 
instruments with a positive discourse framed in terms of ‘inclusion’ and ‘integration’, 
might limit its effectiveness. On the one hand, the RED is a hard-law measure that already 
prohibits ethnic origin discrimination, so soft-law Roma measures may in principle 
complement it. On the other hand, however, soft-law measures are insufficient on their 
own to improve the effectiveness of RED as regards the Roma or to guarantee the related 
measures are implemented. In fact, the non-binding character of the two main Roma 
instruments might be the main weakness of the EU policy in this field. This leaves MS large 
flexibility to pick measures to implement and may lead to ‘a plethora of diverse 
approaches and policy solutions’ (Mirga-Kruszelnicka 2017: 19), which may not always be 
consistent and guarantee equal rights throughout the EU. Some national governments 
may also effectively avoid adopting any measures (Mirga-Kruszelnicka 2017: 19). This is 
evidenced by the fact that only 21% of the measures recommended by the Council in 2013 
have been adopted by more than half of the MS (Commission 2016a). Furthermore, the 
EU Roma Strategy has not led to major changes in the areas of employment, healthcare, 
housing and discrimination (Commission 2017h). Indeed, in a recent consultation, 28% 
and 38% of the respondents considered that, since 2011, the Roma situation has 
worsened in the fields of discrimination and housing, respectively (Commission 2017h; 
see also Commission 2012a, 10, 12).18                                                          
18 Independent reports suggest the situation of Roma has worsened in France, Cyprus, Hungary, Ireland, 
Romania and the UK (Chopin et al. 2017: 10). 
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4. Hard, Soft and Hybrid Regulation 
 
The analysis in the previous section demonstrates a clear shift in the EU regulatory 
approach to equality law from a system largely based on hard law until 2008 to a new 
‘tactic’, from 2010 onwards, that prioritizes soft-law as a means to achieve progress in an 
increasingly adverse economic and political climate. In the now extensive literature on 
new modes of governance, there is a strong case that soft law can be effective at 
coordinating national policies, and that, indeed, it can take on a hard edge even if it is not 
legally binding (Ashiagbor 2005; Korkea-Aho 2009: 271). This section considers, from a 
theoretical perspective, the advantages and limitations of the stronger emphasis on soft 
law in the specific context of equality law. 
The expression ‘new governance’ refers to replacing top down (command and control) 
government with governance based on interactive (reflexive) bottom-up and top-down 
processes and interaction of state governments with socio-economic actors (Trubek and 
Trubek 2005: 343-364). As such, this mode of governance typically utilizes soft law. In the 
EU context, soft law has been primarily used in areas where the EU lacks competence or 
where national diversity of practice requires a more flexible approach. By deploying tools 
such as guidelines and bench marking, peer review and sharing of best practice, and 
monitoring, the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) introduced in the European 
Employment Strategy (EES) post Amsterdam, for example, has been shown to produce 
normative effects and some policy convergence (Ashiagbor 2005). It has done so through, 
among others, ‘foster[ing] a cognitive consensus around common challenges, objectives 
and policy approaches’ (Jacobsson 2003: 355-370). This potential of soft law to produce 
normative change is important not only where there is no competence to regulate, but 
also in light of the fact that classical regulatory techniques based on command and control 
(i.e. ‘hard’ law) are not necessarily always effective. The latter point has been well 
demonstrated by research on the disjuncture between the practical operation of law as 
opposed to its formal letter, 19  or as the problem of ineffective enforcement makes 
apparent (Trubek & Trubek 2005: 361, citing Kilpatrick; Trubek and Cotterell 2005). 
The primary objections to soft law, however, have been that in a context where there is 
an inherent asymmetry between social and market objectives, as is the case of the EU, 
soft law is not itself sufficient to rebalance the two domains, or offset the deleterious 
consequences of market/economic policy and the possible race to the bottom in social 
standards (Trubek and Cotterell 2005).20 The question of whether soft responses are                                                         
19 There is a rich literature in legal realism, new legal realism, and socio-legal studies that explores the 
disjuncture between legal norms as enacted and the way in which law operates in practice, see e.g. Halperin 
(2011). 
20 Interestingly, new macroeconomic governance – which is an inherently hybrid mode of regulation – 
shows that soft law has been used in ways that undermine the ability of national welfare states/social 
models to withstand this ‘race to the bottom’ because it has effectively eroded those social models away; 
see, e.g. Barnard (2012), Ashiagbor (2013) and Schiek (2017). 
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appropriate for an area like equality law is particularly crucial. On the one hand, hard law 
can be a fairly ‘blunt instrument’ for bringing about social change (Barnard 2012), which 
is necessary for achieving substantive equality goals in practice. Thus, softer modes of 
regulation that promote best practices, mutual learning, and emphasize awareness 
raising and attitudinal change – whether in national policies or among the population – 
may, in fact, be more appropriate. On the other hand, presence of hard legal guarantees 
tends to send a strong, symbolic message about the importance of equality and non-
discrimination as essential values (but see Howard 2004; Zeegers 2005). Moreover, there 
is a risk that in absence of binding means, the many soft commitments and strategic 
statements on equality that have been articulated over the years remain unachieved and 
simply aspirational, and that in areas such as equality law, the law loses its precision 
(Milewski and Senac 2014: 189). 
In light of these shortcomings, hybrid approaches that combine hard and soft regulatory 
modes may be most appropriate (Trubek and Trubek 2005), and such an approach has 
been indeed emerging in the context of EU equality law (De Búrca 2012; De Witte 2012). 
However, hybridity carries its own problems including the possibility that soft and hard 
law might interact with each other in ‘antagonistic’ ways: they can ‘obfuscate and 
undermine’ each other (Shaffer and Pollack 2010: 706, 709). As Shaffer and Pollack have 
shown in relation to international law (2010: 746-747; 709), fragmented regulatory 
systems, where distributive conflicts exist and multiple regulatory regimes overlap, can 
be particularly prone to antagonistic relationships, and to strategic bargaining leading to 
hardening of soft law regimes and to the softening of hard law regimes, reducing the 
purported advantages of soft law (e.g. flexibility) and those of hard law (e.g. legal 
certainty and predictability). While these arguments have been developed in the context 
of international law, they tend to resonate with what we observe in EU law, namely, the 
increasing vagueness of (equality) Directives’ provisions (Mason 2010), which have 
softened their effects, and have reduced legal certainty. 
Moreover, the success of the hybrid approaches depends on other environmental 
conditions, and the post-2008 climate has not proven particularly friendly to ensuring 
such approaches can thrive, especially in policy fields that necessitate expenditure and 
administrative capacities to operate effectively. As has by now been noted by numerous 
commentators, both, the macroeconomic governance introduced post 2008, and the 
crisis response promoted at the EU level (especially its second, post-2010 phase, have 
stymied most MS’ scope to maneuver on social policy (Giubboni 2014: 935-963). Building 
on previous OMC experience, the EU’s new economic governance, which itself utilizes a 
hybrid regulatory approach, aims to achieve stricter coordination and convergence of 
national fiscal and economic policies. It relies on technocratic style, and is based on 
surveillance of MS performance to certain targets in relation to budget stability, 
containing imbalances in the Eurozone, and coordination of socio-economic policy 
(Armstrong 2013: 601-617; Schiek 2015). One of its key effects has been to shift fiscal 
decision-making to the EU level and, within particular MS, to finance ministries, with the 
consequence of subordinating spending in areas of social policy to meeting 
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macroeconomic guidelines (or memorandums of understanding for those MS subject to 
Troika bail outs). 
As critics have pointed out, this approach has eroded national social models and has 
exacerbated further the already existing imbalance between the EU’s social and the 
market dimensions (Ashiagbor 2013; Schiek 2015; Garben 2017). While these effects have 
been especially visible in the context of labour law (Barnard 2012; Clauwaert and 
Schömann 2012; Moreau 2011), social security and other policies that directly or 
indirectly affect the state’s delivery of social programs have been also affected. In relation 
to equality field, the implications of this new economic governance and the EU’s crisis 
response – for both, EU-level and national policies – have been explored in feminist social 
policy literature (Annesley and Scheele 2011: 335–347; Karamessini and Rubery 2013; 
Lombardo and Kantola 2017; Walby 2009; Zbyszewska 2017). At the EU level itself, the 
strategy of gender mainstreaming, for example, was significantly undermined in the 
context of the EU’s crisis response (Villa and Smith 2014). Combined, these developments 
have led some scholars to conclude that the project of expanding EU’s social dimension, 
and the original ‘embedded liberal’ bargain, have been reoriented or refocused on a neo-
liberal consensus (Ashiagbor 2013; Höpner and Schäfer 2010: 344-368; Joerges and Rödl 
2009; Scharpf 2010).21 As Schiek (2014: 4) summarizes, this ‘suggests that the EU now 
strives actively for a dismantling of national social policies and pursues a new neo-liberal 
constitutional settlement.’ At the same time, since 2010 on we have also seen a 
proliferation of various initiatives, both hard and soft, that seek the coordination of 
national policies in relation to a wider range of equality issues. As we have observed, 
however, these initiatives appear to be primarily driven by economic rationales, rather 
than human rights objectives. Whether or not this is a strategic choice on the part of the 
Commission (given the post 2008 difficulties to adopt new equality legislation) this 
approach is highly normatively problematic, and may be limiting in terms of the 
substantive changes it can bring about. Indeed, it could lead to the erosion of social and 
equality standards in those MS, where these standards are more robust (Christodoulidis 
and Dukes 2008). 
Against this background, in the next section, we consider whether the recently launched 
European Pillar of Social Rights may contribute to re-center the EU equality discourse 
around social rights – rather than businesses and the market. We will also analyze the 
regulatory and governance approach the Pillar adopts, and its potential to promote 
greater coherence and effectiveness in the field of EU equality law. 
 
5. Moving forward: the European Pillar of Social Rights 
 
In April 2017, the European Commission released its final proposal for the European Pillar 
of Social Rights (Commission 2017b), following a wide public consultation in 2016. The                                                         
21  Somek (2011) had already made this argument in relation to the EES’s mainstreaming of equal treatment 
and non-discrimination principles.  
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Pillar was subsequently proclaimed in November 2017 during the Gothenburg Social 
Summit for Fair Jobs and Growth. Designed ‘as a compass for a renewed process of 
convergence towards better working and living conditions’ (Commission 2017b), the Pillar 
is conceived primarily for the Euro area, although it remains open to all MS. It aims to 
deliver ‘new and more effective rights for citizens’ in areas of equal opportunities and 
access to labour market, fair working conditions, and social protection and inclusion, with 
the view to support the Treaty promise of highly competitive social market economy. 
The Pillar is formed by twenty principles, with five relating to equality law (see Table I).22 
EU institutions have noted, however, that the Pillar’s implementation is a ‘joint 
responsibility’ of EU institutions, MS, social partners and other stakeholders. In this 
regard, EU policymakers have emphasized that their role is ‘set[ing] the framework and 
giv[ing] direction on the way forward for implementation of the Pillar’ (Commission 
2016d). Indeed, the Pillar documentation describes its role as ‘a reference framework to 
screen employment and social performance’ (Commission 2016e: Annex 1) and a tool to 
‘steer greater convergence within the euro area’ (Commission 2016c: 8). To some extent, 
hard-law instruments appear to have a role in this coordinating task. Indeed, the Pillar 
has partly ‘absorbed’ relevant existing legislative proposals, such as the EAA, and it has 
also been accompanied by a new proposal for a Directive on work-life balance 
(Commission 2016c), to replace the failed Maternity Leave Directive (see also Busby, in 
this issue). However, at EU level, the two key tools that will apparently be used to steer 
MS’ social policies are soft-law tools: a) the European Semester, to which the ‘Social 
Scoreboard’ (discussed below) was recently incorporated, and b) European Structural and 
Investment Funds (Commission 2017c: 3). As we show below, this hybrid (mostly soft) 
regulatory approach and the tendency to invoke business and economic rationales to 
justify social action places the Pillar more or less on trajectory with the post-crisis 
regulatory evolution. 
 
 
a. On the scope and the regulatory approach 
 
The way in which the Pillar has been presented gives the impression that it seeks to boost 
the social dimension of the EU rather generally. Indeed, according to preliminary 
documents, the Pillar is about putting ‘citizens first’ (Commission 2017b: 9) and its starting 
point are ‘the social objectives and rights inscribed in EU primary law’ (Commission 2016c: 
2). More recently, the Commission has stated that ‘[b]uilding a fairer Europe and 
strengthening its social dimension is a key priority’ (Commission 2017a) and that the Pillar 
‘provides an opportunity to take a holistic view at the “acquis”’ (Commission 2016c: 8). 
However, the adopted Pillar has a narrow focus that does not cover either all EU social 
objectives or the entire EU territory. Indeed, the Pillar is only supposed to bolster the                                                         
22 These are: Principle 2, Gender equality; Principle 3, Equal opportunities; Principle 9, Work-life balance; 
and Principle 17, Inclusion of people with disabilities. 
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social dimension of the Euro area and is primarily aimed at fostering ‘fair’ and equal labour 
markets, especially in light of increased unemployment post crisis.23 
The Pillar is deemed to achieve a ‘social triple A’ (Commission 2016c: 5) and the 
Commission asserts that it expands the existing acquis (Commission 2016e, Annex 1: 12, 
15, 65), but in reality the Pillar addresses the field of equality rather narrowly. EU law 
generally recognizes the principle of equal treatment and the right to non-
discrimination,24 and at least in certain areas, hard-law formally extends this recognition 
beyond employment to encompass social protection, education, and access to goods and 
services (see also Busby, in this issue). The Pillar, however, emphasizes these rights 
primarily in relation to the access, opportunities, and inclusion in the labour market25. 
Indeed, the labour market emphasis has been clear from the outset, with the 
Commission's early documents referring to equal opportunities as an ‘economic 
imperative’ (Commission 2016e: 6, 8). This perennial labour market and employment link 
was critiqued during the public consultation by some organizations, which wanted to see 
these principles more broadly mainstreamed (Commission 2017k: 10-11). 
Despite the limited number of areas covered by the Pillar, in what follows we consider 
whether two of its features could make a difference in practice, namely, its wording and 
the expansion of the protective scope of some rights. Interestingly, the wording of the 
principles is quite commanding for a soft-law instrument, e.g. Principle 2 on gender 
equality requires that equal treatment be ‘ensured and fostered in all areas’ and Principle 
3, covering all protected grounds, states that ‘[e]qual opportunities of under-represented 
groups shall be fostered’.26 This language emulates the style of hard-law and appears to 
compel MS to take action to implement these principles. However, the Pillar principles 
and rights ‘are not directly enforceable and […] require a translation into dedicated action 
and/or separate pieces of legislation’ (Commission 2017c: 3). In the field of equality law, 
the Pillar has been accompanied by one legislative proposal for a new directive on work-
life balance, linked to Principles 2 and 9.27 In fact, the Pillar documents acknowledge that 
it will be implemented ‘through legislation where needed’ (Commission 2017e), which 
suggests other types of governance tools might be prioritized. Whilst the European 
Council has expressed the Union should develop its social dimension as a ‘shared 
commitment’ of EU institutions and MS (according to their competences) (Commission 
2017j; European Council 2017), the more technical Pillar documentation appears to 
indicate that national governments, social partners and civil society organizations are 
                                                        
23 See also Commission 2017b (Preamble (recitals 9-14) and the title of Chapter 1). 
24 Articles 20, 21, 23 CFREU. 
25 See Principle 6, equal opportunities, in general, and Principles 5 and 17 on gender equality and disability, 
respectively. 
26 See further Table I. 
27 See further Table I. 
Article accepted for publication in the special issue: 'Taking Stock of Twenty Years of EU Equality Law and 
Policymaking and Looking Ahead', forthcoming in 2018 at the International Journal of Discrimination & 
the Law – Please refer to the published article for citing/referencing purposes. 
 
 18 
expected to take most of the implementing measures. 28  Considering the post-2010 
reluctance of many MS to take action in this field, it is doubtful that this hybrid approach 
will be effective. 
Still, some soft action is being taken transnationally, particularly through the European 
Semester, and more specifically through the Social Scoreboard. This instrument tracks 
and compares performance and progress of MS through twelve policy areas, broken down 
in in fourteen headline indicators relating to three main dimensions or ‘chapters’. Chapter 
1 concerns equal opportunities and access to the labour market, Chapter 2 deals with 
dynamic labour markets and fair working conditions, and Chapter 3 relates to public 
support, social protection and inclusion (Commission 2016h). The data gathered through 
these chapters is analyzed and used to prepare the Country Reports for the European 
Semester and it also feeds into the annual Joint Employment Report (Commission 2018). 
In principle, the Social Scoreboard can be a valid soft tool to identify areas where national 
action is needed, to monitor evolution and to engage in ongoing and constructive 
dialogue with MS on how best to achieve progress in their specific circumstances. 
However, a careful scrutiny of the Scoreboard reveals that only one area (‘Gender equality 
in the labour market’) and one headline indicator (‘Gender employment Gap’) are directly 
relevant to equality law, specifically, to gender discrimination (Commission 2016h). While 
the gender dimension is also present in many indicators because the data are often 
broken down by gender, the only other discrimination ground indirectly considered in the 
Social Scoreboard is age, which relates to the area ‘Youth’ and the headline indicator 
‘Young people neither in employment nor in education and training’.29 This evidences the 
very narrow focus of the Social Scoreboard compared to the much broader scope of EU 
equality law, which prohibits discrimination on many other grounds, and covers 
discrimination beyond employment for gender and race/ethnic discrimination (and 
potentially for new grounds too if 2008 proposal is adopted). Indeed, during the public 
consultation, several stakeholders expressed concerns about the lack of emphasis on, 
inter alia, ethnic discrimination, the rights of undocumented migrants, the rights of EU 
mobile citizens, and more generally, rights outside the labour market (Commission 
2017k). 
 
Secondly, the Pillar refers to pre-existing primary and secondary law but goes beyond the 
scope of protection of the legal framework that predates it.30 For instance, Principle 3 
extends the right to equal treatment beyond employment to areas like social protection, 
education and healthcare for all the protected grounds; Principle 15 recognizes a right to                                                         
28  Either through the adoption of national regulation, via collective bargaining or by collecting and 
exchanging best practices, see Commission (2017c: 4, and for each principle, the section ‘What MS and 
social partners can do’). 
29 Some headline indicators are also broken down by age categories, e.g. ‘ Employment rate ’  and ‘
Unemployment rate’ (Commission 2016h). 
30 See further Table I. 
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a pension and to sufficient resources to live with dignity in old age. 31  However, 
considering MS averseness (or indeed, increasingly limited ability) to take action in this 
field post-2010, it is doubtful that citizens will fully benefit from this extended protection 
given the lack of hard-law measures that require such action. Even more worryingly, some 
MS may choose to extend the scope of their legislation, while others not, which would 
negatively affect the uniform application of EU equality law and would create inequalities 
between individuals, depending on the MS where they reside. 
In conclusion: the Pillar continues with the post-2010 tendency of softened or hybrid 
regulation, which prioritizes policy coordination over hard regulation. Arguably, then, its 
very broad and seemingly far-reaching principles are likely to be drastically reduced to a 
very core minimum in its implementation through soft-law; a minimum that does not 
even scrutinize progress on the basic rights EU protects. For this reasons, it is questionable 
that the Pillar, as such, will add anything to the legal framework, apart from elevating 
visibility for certain rights and principles (Commission 2017c: 3). 
 
b. On the market-oriented approach 
 
Also in line with the post-2010 developments, the Pillar draws heavily on economic 
rationales of growth and competitiveness, with the importance of social policy and 
expenditure reasserted in its early drafts (Commission 2016e: 7). As already observed, 
despite its promise to bolster the Euro area’s social dimension, and its apparent role in  
‘encourag[ing] a race to the top’ (Commission 2017i) in social standards, both EU and 
national actors see the Pillar as a tool to improve macroeconomic performance, and, 
particularly, the labour market performance. In this regard, the Pillar’s Preamble 
consistently refers to competitiveness and unemployment, and its potential to foster 
‘efficient employment and social outcomes’, ‘fair and well-functioning labour markets’, 
and improve ‘employment and social performance’. 32  Similarly, the Communication 
launching the Pillar conceives social policy ‘as a productive factor’ (Commission 2016c: 2). 
According to President Juncker, the EU will work to gain a ‘social triple A’, to which the 
Pillar will contribute, but the Commission has stressed that this is ‘not just a political or 
social imperative [it is] also an economic necessity’ (Commission 2016c: 5). 
The preeminence of the economic approach is also evident from MS statements. For 
instance, a recent Trio Presidency declaration presents the Pillar as setting out ‘an agenda 
for better performing economies and more equitable and resilient societies’, which 
‘enshrines gender equality as one the EU’s key principles and rights’ (Presidency 2017). 
In so far as its equality aims, the Pillar seeks primarily to foster equal opportunities and 
access to the labour markets for women and men and other disadvantaged groups 
(Commission 2017j). This objective is especially crucial given the post-crisis increase in                                                         
31 See further Table I. 
32 Social Pillar Preamble, Recitals 12-14. 
Article accepted for publication in the special issue: 'Taking Stock of Twenty Years of EU Equality Law and 
Policymaking and Looking Ahead', forthcoming in 2018 at the International Journal of Discrimination & 
the Law – Please refer to the published article for citing/referencing purposes. 
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long-term unemployment, to which the growth of inequality, poverty and exclusion is 
ultimately attributed (Commission 2016g: 21-22). 33  However, attaining the Pillar’s 
equality principles seems often subordinated to economic interests. For instance, in line 
with the 2016 Inter-Institutional Agreement on better regulation,34 the Commission has 
noted that potential Directives adopted to implement Principles 2 (gender equality) and 
9 (work-life balance) should ‘avoid imposing administrative, financial and legal constraints 
in a way which would hold back the creation and development of small and medium-sized 
undertakings’.35 
Although labour market, growth and competitiveness objectives have been present in 
Pillar proposals from the start, it appears that their strong preeminence in its final 
configuration is a response to the concerns voiced by MS and businesses during the 2016 
consultation that preceded its adoption. MS feared that imposition of social standards 
that are ‘too high’ would pose a threat to competitiveness and fiscal sustainability, 
instead suggesting that ‘the focus of the Pillar should not be on social rights as such, but 
on increased productivity and job creation’ (Commission 2017k: 9). Likewise, employer 
organizations critiqued the early Pillar proposals as ‘not sufficiently focus[ed] on areas 
that can generate growth and improve competitiveness’, or the role of ‘free enterprise as 
a driver of inclusive growth’ (Commission 2017k: 11). The latter also emphasized the need 
for a softer regulatory approach, more clearly entwined with economic policy. Indeed, 
the Pillar’s primary mode of delivery is through the Social Scoreboard and it has been 
integrated into the European Semester. While such entwining means that equal 
treatment and non-discrimination, as well as the other Pillar social principles, have now 
been mainstreamed into economic and fiscal policy, the question remains whether these 
rights and social values will inform the latter or will be ultimately subordinated to them 
yet again.  
 
6. Conclusion  
 
Following a turbulent decade since the onset of the crisis in 2007-2008, the introduction 
of the Pillar has been welcomed (Garben, Kilpatrick and Muir 2017; Hendrickx 2017: 191-
192; Schiek 2017), as it appears to represent the EU’s reassertion of its commitment to 
the social dimension. The Pillar has been regarded as a response to the concerns about 
the EU’s democratic deficit, which have increased due to the character of new economic 
governance, its technocratic form and the surge of soft instruments adopted without 
need for oversight. This democratic deficit, paired with the decline of national social 
policies and the resulting breakdown of the ‘embedded liberal bargain’, has exacerbated 
the asymmetry between the market and social dimensions of the EU.                                                         
33 See also Social Pillar, Recitals 9-14 related to labour markets; made clear also by the title of Chapter 1: 
Equal opportunities and access to the labour market. 
34 Supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.. 
35 This constraint applies to directives adopted in the basis of Article 153 TFEU, see Commission (2017c: 10, 
37). 
Article accepted for publication in the special issue: 'Taking Stock of Twenty Years of EU Equality Law and 
Policymaking and Looking Ahead', forthcoming in 2018 at the International Journal of Discrimination & 
the Law – Please refer to the published article for citing/referencing purposes. 
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Although one single instrument may not reasonably be expected to solve both the EU’s 
democratic deficit and the cracks in MS systems of social protection, the Pillar is pertinent, 
especially if, with Schiek, we accept that the solution to the imbalance that has long 
plagued the European project should be found at EU level (Schiek 2015, 2017). As Schiek 
has pointed out, an internal transnational market can only be ‘embedded’ through 
transnational social policy (or in combination with the national level) (Schiek 2015, 2017). 
However, as we have shown in section 4, the Pillar’s social ambitions are subordinated to 
its economic rationales. Even if, ‘[e]conomic and social progress are intertwined’ 
(European Council 2017: at 11), it is questionable a Pillar of Social Rights mainly driven by 
economic objectives will deliver its social promises since any conflict of interest between 
the economic and the social is likely to be resolved in favour of the former. 
As we have shown here in relation to equality law and related policy, despite its apparent 
aspiration to expand the equal treatment and non-discrimination principles beyond their 
existing scope, the Pillar falls very short of the promise. Save for a couple of concrete 
measures, such as the proposed Directive on work-life balance, or the Pillar’s absorption 
of the pre-existing plans for the EAA, the Pillar has not been (at least yet) accompanied 
by sufficiently robust measures to suggest that its ‘programme of principles’ is indeed 
going to become a ‘programme of action’. Instead, the Pillar continues along the 
trajectory of softening (or hybridity) and marketization evident in social policy, including 
in equality law and policy, over the last decade. 
Consequently, despite the aspirational discourse that the EU so often espouses, it appears 
that the Pillar is unlikely, as it currently is, to rebalance the economic and social 
dimensions, and to help EU equality law to escape its market-making origins and its 
current incoherence and disarticulation from other relevant policy fields. There are 
certain social goals that, while costly and apparently unfriendly to business, are necessary 
to achieve a fairer and better European society. The European Pillar of Social Rights may 
‘be part of wider efforts to build a more inclusive and sustainable growth model’ 
(European Council 2017: at 11) in Europe, but it is doubtful that it will achieve its aims if 
improving Europe’s competitiveness and achieving economic growth continues to be its 
primary driving force. 
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Table I. The EU Pillar of Social Rights: Equality Law Principles, Scope and New and Existing measures 
 
Principle Primary law & existing secondary law Has the Pillar added anything? 
Is the Pillar proposing any soft or 
hard-law measure? 
Soft-law Hard-law 
2. Gender 
equality 
 
Arts. 23, 33 CFREU 
Arts. 19, 157 TFEU 
-Directives 79/7/EEC (equal treatment in 
social security), 92/85/EEC 
(pregnancy/maternity), 2004/113/EC (goods 
& services) 2006/54/EC (employment), 
2010/18/EU (parental leave), 2010/41/EU 
(self-employed) 
-Recommendation 2014/124/EU (pay 
transparency) 
-Proposal for a Directive on Women on 
Company boards (COM(2012) 614 final) 
-Strategic Engagement for Gender Equality 
2016-2019 (SWD(2015) 278 final) 
-Requires that equality is ‘ensured’, not 
just pursued 
-Extends the scope of protection to all 
areas, beyond existing acquis (e.g. to 
the media and to the field of education) 
-New start to 
support Work-Life 
Balance for parents 
and carers 
(COM(2017) 252 
final), includes 
legislative actions – 
see column to the 
right) 
-Follow-up reports 
on the Pay 
Transparency 
Recommendation 
-Proposal for a work-
life balance Directive 
(COM(2017) 253 
final) 
-Accession to 
Istanbul Convention 
3. Equal 
opportunities 
 
Art. 21 CFEU 
Arts. 18, 19 TFEU 
-Directives 2000/43/EC (race/ethnic origin), 
2000/78/EC (religion/belief, disability, age, 
sexual orientation in employment) 
-‘Solo’ provisions on third country nationals 
in specific Directives (e.g. Blue Card, 
Students, Family Reunification) 
-Proposal for a Horizontal Equality Directive 
(COM(2008) 426 final) 
-Requires that equal opportunities are 
‘fostered’, which may entail that 
positive action is mandated, not just 
allowed. 
-Extends protection against 
discrimination on the grounds of 
religion/belief, disability, age and 
sexual orientation beyond employment 
(to social protection, education, and 
access to goods and services). 
--- 
-Continue 
supporting and 
making progress in 
negotiations on the 
Horizontal Equality 
Directive Proposal 
(COM(2008) 426 
final) 
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Principle Primary law & existing secondary law Has the Pillar added anything? 
Is the Pillar proposing any soft or 
hard-law measure? 
Soft-law Hard-law 
-Recommendation 2013/C 378/01 (Roma) 
9. Work-life 
balance 
 
Arts. 23, 33 CFREU 
Arts. 153(2), 157(3) TFEU 
Directive 92/85/EEC (pregnancy/maternity), 
2010/41/EU (maternity leave for the self-
employed), 2010/18/EU (parental leave), 
97/81/EC (part-time workers) 
-The principle applies to anyone who is 
in employment and has caring 
responsibilities (not only parents) 
-It recognizes a right to flexible working 
arrangements to anyone with caring 
responsibilities, not just to parents 
returning from parental leave. 
-Requires that women and men have 
equal access to leaves for caring 
purposes and that they are 
‘encouraged to use them in a balanced 
way’. 
-New start to 
support Work-Life 
Balance for parents 
and carers 
initiative (see 
above) 
-Proposal for a work-
life balance Directive 
(see above) 
 
15. Old age 
income and 
pensions 
 
Arts. 23, 25, 34 CFREU 
Arts. 19, 151, 153, 156, 157(3) TFEU 
-Directives 79/7/EEC (equal treatment in 
social security), 2006/54/EC (gender equality 
in employment); 2004/113/EC (gender 
equality in access to goods & services) 
-Regulation 883/2004 (coordination of social 
security systems) 
-Recommendation 92/442/EEC (convergence 
in social protection) 
-The principle requires that men and 
women have equal opportunities in 
acquiring pension rights, which may 
entail, inter alia, ‘adequate crediting of 
pension rights for care periods’. 
-The principle recognizes the right to a 
pension and to enough resources to 
live with dignity in old age. 
-Social partners 
consultation on 
‘Access to Social 
Protection’ 
(C(2017) 2610, 
includes 
occupational right 
and pension rights’ 
transferability and 
transparency) 
--- 
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Principle Primary law & existing secondary law Has the Pillar added anything? 
Is the Pillar proposing any soft or 
hard-law measure? 
Soft-law Hard-law 
17. Inclusion 
of people with 
disabilities 
 
EU as party of the UN Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
Arts. 21, 26, 34 CFREU 
Arts. 19, 153 TFEU 
-Directive 2000/78/EC (disability 
discrimination in employment) 
-‘Solo’ provisions on sectoral legislation (e.g. 
transport, consumer protection, 
telecommunication, state aid, public 
procurement, health and safety).-Proposal 
for a Horizontal Directive on, inter alia, 
disability, (see above) 
-European Disability Strategy 2010-2020 
(COM(2010) 636 final) 
The principle recognizes three mutually 
reinforcing rights: 
1. Right to income support to live in 
dignity 
2. Right to services facilitating labour 
market participation 
3. Right to an adapted working 
environment 
-Continue to 
mainstream 
disability matters 
into relevant policy 
areas 
-Continue 
supporting and 
making progress in 
negotiations on: 
1. The Horizontal 
Directive Proposal 
(see above) 
2.The European 
Disability Act (COM 
2015 615 final) 
Source: Own elaboration on the basis of Commission (2017b, 2017c).
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